Most useful for cybersecurity go-to-market messaging and pitch-deck reframes for informed buyers.
Best for
Cybersecurity brands needing structural messaging help for pitch decks aimed at go-to-market peers.
Not for
Detection-and-response vendors seeking technical tutorials, benchmarks, implementation playbooks, or threat research for security operations.
Key takeaways
Pitch decks should reframe the problem, show the moat, arm champions, and cite external forces.
Separate whether a category is early from whether fear is holding you back.
Digital Executive Protection and Digital Risk Protection may see consolidation, new investment, expansion beyond enterprise buyers.
Check first: Confirm paid collaboration is available and ask for audience composition data.
Main ideas
Cybersecurity pitch decks are still written for a 2018 buyer · Separate “is the category early?” from “am I holding back?” · Watch where a security category is being primed to go
Evan Goldberg writes about cybersecurity markets and go-to-market strategy.
Their posts examine how companies should message to buyers who already understand their security problem, how to judge early-category opportunities, and what investor or adviser interest may signal about a market.
For campaign fit, ask whether a signature book, show, business, or earlier work also explains searches for their name.
Goldberg connects market judgments to concrete decisions.
In the pitch-deck post, they argue that informed buyers need a sharper narrative: show what makes a company difficult to copy, help an internal champion make the case, and explain why outside forces make the problem harder to ignore.
In a personal account of turning down a role, they distinguish between whether a category is early and whether fear is holding someone back; they say their mistake was treating comfort as market analysis.
In a post on Digital Executive Protection and Digital Risk Protection, they offer consolidation and new investment as possibilities, note potential expansion beyond enterprise buyers, and stop short of predicting what will happen.
Together, the posts show readers interested in cybersecurity positioning and market formation both their recommendations and how they qualify uncertainty.
Evan Goldberg's ideas repeat one move: take a claim a market treats as settled and ask whether it still holds.
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Applied to cybersecurity go-to-market, that means the pitch deck should stop convincing buyers they have a problem and start reframing one they already know about.
Applied to a career decision, it means splitting a market-timing question from a question about personal comfort.
Applied to a category, it means reading inbound advisor interest as a signal rather than a forecast.
The posts are short, first-person and built around a single reframe each: opinion-led arguments rather than playbooks, data or benchmarks.
Cybersecurity pitch decks are still written for a 2018 buyer
Goldberg argues that the standard security deck assumes the prospect still needs convincing they have a problem.
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They describe today's buyer as someone who has already researched the issue, talked to peers, consumed a lot of content and often evaluated two competitors before accepting a call. Because that buyer arrives informed, the long-running Sales-versus-Marketing disagreement over what a deck is for—a story or a tool to move a deal—may narrow: the narrative has moved further down the funnel, and one artifact can now do both jobs.
The prescription is four swaps: instead of diagnosing the problem, reframe how the buyer sees it; instead of listing differentiators, show the moat; instead of pitching only the company, give the internal champion ammunition to sell it internally; and instead of asserting the problem is important, show the external forces making it harder to ignore.
The need for narrative did not disappear; it moved down the funnel, where it has to be sharper and narrower.
Separate “is the category early?” from “am I holding back?”
Goldberg describes turning down a role because the category felt early and the market might not be ready, while staying in what looked like a safe job.
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The company later raised a Series B and was named a category leader by Gartner; the job they stayed in was caught in a reduction in force.
The lesson, they say, is not about the outcome but the reasoning: comfort made the decision while it was labeled market analysis and bad timing.
Their correction is to ask two questions instead of one: whether the category is early, which is about the market, and whether they are the one holding back, which they say is usually fear talking.
The post lists the objections at the time—the category feels early; is the market ready for this problem?; I'm comfortable where I am; we have a baby on the way—and sets them against a career spent building categories before the market was ready for them.
The post names the tension: had the company flamed out, the same decision would have looked smart, and Goldberg says that would have been the wrong conclusion, too. The behavioral change they describe is to stop treating cybersecurity stability as automatic and stop waiting for the right time.
Watch where a security category is being primed to go
Goldberg reports a recent run of advisory firms asking about Digital Executive Protection and Digital Risk Protection—market trends, growth, penetration and convergence with consumer offerings—and reads the pattern as a possible sign of consolidation, significant startup investment or both.
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They find the framing that takes these capabilities beyond the traditional enterprise buyer into consumer and small-to-medium-business segments most interesting, saying it could materially expand the market. The post ends on curiosity, not a prediction.
Goldberg says they are curious where this goes and jokes that cybersecurity did not need two more markets getting overly crowded, framing the observation as a direction of travel, not a sized forecast.
The same method runs through all three posts: rather than telling readers something matters, Goldberg redirects the argument to a sharper version of it.
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The posts are short, first-person and each built around one reframe, with no step-by-step how-to material, data or frameworks beyond paired contrasts.
In the deck post, external forces replace the assertion that the problem matters, and the moat replaces a list of differentiators.
In the career post, a decision framed as market analysis becomes a question about comfort.
In the market post, a question about where consumer and SME expansion leads replaces a declared outcome.
If you want one post that shows how Evan Goldberg thinks about buyer messaging, start here.
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It answers a newcomer’s natural question: what does this person actually teach about go-to-market, beyond describing markets in the abstract?
Goldberg argues that the standard cybersecurity deck was written for a buyer who still needed convincing they had a problem.
In their description, that buyer has already researched the issue, talked to peers, and evaluated competitors before taking the call.
The post reframes an old Sales-versus-Marketing dispute: Marketing wants a story that connects buyer, problem, and solution, while Sales wants something usable in a live conversation.
Because the buyer arrives informed, the two jobs converge.
Goldberg says the modern deck should reframe how the buyer sees the problem rather than diagnose it, show the moat rather than list differentiators, arm an internal champion to sell the deck internally, and point to external forces making the problem harder to ignore.
The narrative has not disappeared; it has moved further down the funnel and must be sharper and narrower.
For brands planning a campaign
For a cybersecurity company reworking its pitch deck, this post is close to a working outline.
It suggests evaluating the current deck against four jobs — reframing, demonstrating a moat, equipping an internal champion, and naming external pressure — and explains why each matters to a buyer who has already done their homework.
The Sales/Marketing tension is also a useful diagnostic: if internal teams disagree about what the deck is for, resolve that before rewriting slides.
This post shows how Goldberg separates genuine market-timing judgment from personal discomfort, which matters to anyone trying to read their commentary on early categories.
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It is the most personal of the three posts and the clearest window into how they reason.
Goldberg describes declining a recruiter’s offer from a company they thought was strong, citing an early category, uncertain market readiness, comfort in their current role, and a second child on the way.
They then recount what happened next: the birth, a layoff at the job they had stayed for, and the other company’s Series B, category-leader recognition, and brand work.
Goldberg is explicit that the outcome is not the lesson — the reasoning is.
They say perceived comfort drove the decision, which they labeled market analysis and bad timing.
Their corrections: stop treating a stable cybersecurity job as inherently safe, and ask two separate questions — whether the category is early and whether they are the one holding back.
The post ends with a direct question to readers about a reason they have used to say no.
For brands planning a campaign
This is less a messaging template than a signal about how Goldberg evaluates early-category bets and risk.
For a campaign about category building or a company asking buyers to move before a market is settled, their framing — separate the market question from the internal objection — can be reused in positioning and sales conversations with cautious buyers.
It also signals a preference for candid, first-person argument over polished corporate framing, which matters if you’re deciding how Goldberg would sound writing for a brand.
This post shows what Goldberg watches when a security category starts attracting investor and advisor attention.
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It is the shortest of the three and shows how they read market signals from inbound conversations.
Goldberg reports a run of advisory-firm interest in Digital Executive Protection and Digital Risk Protection — market trends, growth, penetration, and convergence with consumer offerings.
They read that pattern as a possible sign of consolidation, new startup investment, or both, and joke that cybersecurity did not need two more crowded markets.
What they find interesting is the framing of these capabilities moving beyond the traditional enterprise buyer into consumer and small-to-medium-business segments, which could materially expand the market.
Goldberg says they are curious where it goes, without predicting an outcome.
For brands planning a campaign
Useful for a company weighing whether to extend an enterprise security capability into consumer or SME markets, or for one trying to place itself in a category that advisors are suddenly discussing. The post models a light-touch way to publish market observations without overclaiming: describe the inbound pattern, offer two plausible explanations, flag the expansion angle, and stop short of a forecast.
A recurring preference for reframing over asserting3
Rebuilding the cybersecurity pitch deck for buyers who have already done the research1
Category timing: separating market readiness from personal caution1
Watching digital risk protection for consolidation and consumer expansion1
Rebuilding the cybersecurity pitch deck for buyers who have already done the research
Evan Goldberg argues that most cybersecurity pitch decks are still built for the buyer of 2018, when the deck’s job was to convince a prospect they had a problem.
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In their account, buyers now arrive having researched the issue, talked to peers, consumed content, and often evaluated two competitors before taking a call.
The practical prescription is four swaps: don’t diagnose the problem; reframe how the buyer sees it.
Don’t just list differentiators; show the moat.
Don’t only pitch the company; give the internal champion ammunition to sell it internally.
And don’t assert that the problem matters; show the outside forces making it harder to ignore.
Goldberg also notes that, as the narrative moves further down the funnel, the long-running Sales-versus-Marketing disagreement over what a deck is for may narrow: a story deck and a deal-accelerating deck can now be the same artifact.
Frames each recommendation as a contrast between a slide’s old job and its current job, rather than as a general principle.
For brands planning a campaign
For a brief centered on pitch decks and go-to-market narrative, the usable angles are concrete: rebuild the deck around reframing the problem rather than educating the buyer, give the champion material to reuse internally, and tie urgency to external market forces instead of assertion. Expect a structural argument about slide flow and messaging sequence, not copy-editing of existing slides.
Category timing: separating market readiness from personal caution
Goldberg describes turning down a role because the category felt early and the market might not be ready, while staying in what looked like a safe job.
Read more
The company they passed on later raised a Series B and was named a category leader by Gartner; the job they stayed in was caught in a reduction in force.
The lesson they draw is that the outcome was not the real problem—the reasoning was.
They now refuse to take “safe” at face value and split one question into two: “Is the category early?”
(a market question) and “Am I?”
(which they describe as usually fear talking).
The post is a first-person account of building categories before the market was ready, the same bet they declined to make again.
Separates a market-timing question from a personal-comfort question and applies both to the same decision.
For brands planning a campaign
Relevant when a brand wants a credible voice on category creation and pre-market bets: the framing that early categories are where category builders should be, and that incumbency is not automatically safer.
This is a personal career narrative, not market analysis.
Ask for market evidence if the campaign needs to support a claim about a specific buyer segment.
Watching digital risk protection for consolidation and consumer expansion
Goldberg reports a recent run of advisory firms asking about Digital Executive Protection and Digital Risk Protection market trends—growth, penetration, and B2C convergence.
Read more
They read the pattern as a sign these markets are being primed for consolidation, attracting significant startup investment, or possibly both.
The part they flag as most interesting is framing these capabilities beyond the traditional enterprise buyer, for consumer and SME segments, which they say could materially expand the market.
The post ends with an open question about where this goes, rather than a forecast.
This post is a short observation of inbound advisory interest, not an analysis with numbers or sources; the consolidation and investment readings are explicitly offered as possibilities.
For brands planning a campaign
Useful for messaging aimed at extending a security capability from enterprise to consumer or SME buyers, and for brands positioning around consolidation or investment activity in executive and digital risk protection. Ask for market-sizing evidence before using Goldberg’s view as a sizing claim.
A recurring preference for reframing over asserting
The same move recurs across the posts: rather than asserting that something matters, Goldberg redirects the argument.
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In the pitch-deck post, that means showing external forces instead of telling the buyer the problem is important, and showing the moat instead of listing differentiators.
In the career post, it means reframing a decision from market analysis into an honest question about comfort.
In the market post, it means asking where consumer and SME expansion leads instead of declaring an outcome.
The posts are short, first-person, and built around a single reframe each, with paired contrasts rather than step-by-step how-to material, data, or frameworks.
For brands planning a campaign
Expect sharp, opinion-led reframing of a GTM or category question, not tutorials, benchmarks, or implementation playbooks in Goldberg’s posts. If a campaign needs executable process content, ask for that layer separately.
The available posts document no brand, sponsorship, client, or business relationship for Evan Goldberg.
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They write about cybersecurity go-to-market work and a job offer they declined, but name no employer, client, or commercial partner; the companies in those stories remain unnamed.
Passing references to Gartner as a category-leader designation for someone else’s company and to Claude describe the market, not a relationship they hold.
Ask for a list of any current brand, sponsorship, client, or business relationships.
Evan Goldberg writes short, first-person posts about the commercial side of cybersecurity: how security vendors should pitch when buyers have already done the research, why a category being early is different from whether you are holding back, and where markets like digital executive protection might be heading next.
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The thread running through the work is reframing — taking a claim the market treats as settled and testing whether it still holds — rather than teaching a process.
Buyers who need implementation detail or benchmarks should ask for those directly.
Work backward from the pitch-deck post: it makes the clearest argument and states the four moves they recommend.
The category-timing post applies the same instinct to a personal decision, while the digital-risk-protection post shows how they handle an open market question.
For readers who want the same territory developed with more method, Andrew Wright diagnoses sales problems from the conversations themselves, Sayanta Goswami builds a named positioning framework around how enterprise buyers form conclusions before the first call, and Zach Murphy writes about buyer decision friction and the marketing function's role in growth.
Wright writes short first-person posts about why B2B commercial efforts underperform and shares Goldberg's preference for understanding what is actually happening over reacting to surface numbers.
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Both treat a missed target or stalled deal as a symptom that needs a better diagnosis.
Wright works inside sales execution: he listens to calls, tracks where buyers disengage, and questions coaching discipline, follow-up and next steps. Goldberg stays at the messaging and category layer — what a deck should do, whether a category is ready — and writes opinion-led reframes rather than a repeatable diagnostic routine a team could run.
Both argue that the buyer's conclusion is formed before the sales conversation starts.
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Goswami describes sophisticated buyers placing a firm in the wrong category during silent research; Goldberg describes a buyer who has already researched the problem and evaluated competitors before taking the call.
Goswami packages the argument as a proprietary framework with client outcome figures and a direct approach offer, focusing on enterprise positioning for eight- and nine-figure firms. Goldberg's posts are shorter and more open-ended, with no named framework or claimed results, and apply the same idea specifically to cybersecurity decks.
Murphy makes a closely related argument about go-to-market: funnels and staged content give buyers homework instead of helping them reach a decision, and marketing should be judged on business outcomes rather than marketing metrics.
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Both challenge the received playbook for how B2B marketing and sales address buyers.
Murphy writes about the marketing function's organizational role and buyer decision pressure across sectors, including how marketing earns a seat at the growth table. Goldberg focuses on cybersecurity and narrative artifacts such as pitch decks and category timing.
For a cybersecurity pitch-deck campaign aimed at buyers who already know the problem, the placement question is whether a small, LinkedIn-centered cybersecurity marketing audience matches the campaign’s reach target.
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Evan Goldberg’s posts show about 3,964 LinkedIn followers.
Three posts dated 15–23 September 2026 offer commentary for people who sell, market, or invest in cybersecurity: category timing and career risk, how pitch decks should be structured for buyers who already know the problem, and consolidation signals in digital executive protection and digital risk protection.
That points to an audience of GTM peers — marketers, founders, and sales-adjacent operators — rather than enterprise security practitioners or buyers.
To assess this creator, ask for documented audience data for the last several months — a LinkedIn demographic report or an audience survey reporting job function, seniority, company size, and geography — plus recent results for comparable commentary posts of similar topic and depth.
Evan Goldberg's posts do not offer partnerships or sponsorships.
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The three available posts cover market and career commentary: turning down a job and the reasoning behind it; how cybersecurity pitch decks need to change now that buyers arrive already educated; and advisory interest in digital executive protection and digital risk protection markets.
None describes sponsored content, brand collaborations, rates, formats, deliverables, or how a brand could approach them about paid work.
The posts do not establish whether they accept sponsorships or confirm an official inquiry route.
Before budgeting, ask directly whether they accept partnerships and how to approach them.
The pitch-deck and go-to-market campaign is the strongest match: Evan Goldberg has already published a specific answer to the need.
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Their post on cybersecurity decks argues that most are still written for buyers who need convincing they have a problem, and prescribes four swaps: reframe the problem instead of diagnosing it, show the moat instead of listing differentiators, give the internal champion ammunition instead of only pitching the company, and point to external forces instead of asserting urgency.
They also treat the long-running Sales-versus-Marketing argument over what a deck is for as a symptom of the old funnel — useful framing for a company whose teams disagree about the deck’s job before anyone rewrites slides.
Expect a structural argument about messaging sequence and slide purpose, delivered in short, first-person, opinion-led posts built around one reframe each.
The audience reads as go-to-market peers — marketers, founders and sales-adjacent operators — rather than enterprise security buyers.
Goldberg has about 3,964 LinkedIn followers; ask for audience-composition data if reach into a specific buyer group matters.
The commercial path is unconfirmed: ask directly whether paid collaboration is available before budgeting, since the posts describe no sponsorship, partner terms or inquiry route.
When to choose a specialist
A detection-and-response vendor seeking a practitioner content series — technical tutorials, benchmark data, implementation playbooks or threat research a security operations audience can execute — would find little support in these posts.
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The three posts are short reframes with no step-by-step guidance, data, benchmarks or frameworks beyond paired contrasts.
Even where the pitch-deck post gets concrete, it stays at the level of what a slide should accomplish, not how to build it; a campaign needing executable process content would have to supply that layer itself.
The same mismatch applies to campaigns that hinge on demonstrated operator credentials or segment proof.
Goldberg’s career post is a personal account of a category-timing decision, not proof about a buyer segment; citing it as evidence of demand or adoption would overread it.
Reach is another constraint: Goldberg has roughly 3,964 LinkedIn followers, with no demographic, function or seniority data available.
Ask for that data before committing to a reach target or a campaign aimed at enterprise security practitioners and buyers rather than the marketers and founders these posts speak to.
A worked campaign example
Worked angle for a pitch-deck campaign — the sponsor is a cybersecurity company whose deck still opens by establishing that the problem exists, and whose sales and marketing teams disagree about whether it should tell a story or push a deal forward.
Step one, the bylined post.
Open on the 2018-versus-now contrast: the buyer has already researched the issue, talked to peers and evaluated two competitors before taking the call, so the deck’s old job is gone.
Then name one assumption in the sponsor’s own category — something like "we have to prove the problem exists" — and replace it with a reframe their buyers can repeat.
The sponsor supplies the category specifics; the argument structure comes from the post that already makes this case.
Step two, the internal-champion piece.
Most deals stall inside the customer’s committee, not in the meeting.
A second post arguing for arming the champion — the colleague who has to sell the purchase when the vendor is not in the room — positions the deck as an internal sales asset rather than a pitch.
This is where the sponsor’s own enablement material belongs: the creator makes the argument, the brand produces the leave-behind.
Step three, the Sales-versus-Marketing hook.
Use Goldberg’s framing that the buyer’s changing journey narrows the old disagreement, and let the sponsor address its own teams in public.
It reads as candour rather than product messaging and fits the candid first-person register of the posts.
Close with a question to readers, as Goldberg does, and keep each piece to one reframe.
The tradeoff: a technical practitioner voice would reach security operators directly but would not help with a deck or a GTM narrative, the actual problem here.
Before committing spend, confirm that paid collaboration is available; the posts describe no offer or inquiry route.
No post dates were provided, so ask for them to assess recency.
Choose Andrew Wright when the real bottleneck is not the deck but the sales conversations it is meant to support.
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If a cybersecurity sponsor's deals stall because reps present too early, miss the buyer's actual problem or follow up without giving the buyer a reason to continue, Wright's posts speak directly to that task.
Their work offers a listen-first diagnosis: inspect actual conversations, watch where buyer interest drops, treat repeated objections as information rather than something to overcome, and only then decide whether the team needs coaching, a different sales approach or more activity.
That makes Wright a better fit for a campaign aimed at sales leadership and frontline sales behaviour than for one whose deliverable is a revised pitch deck or category narrative.
Wright does not supply the deck structure or messaging sequence that Goldberg's post gives a cybersecurity company rewriting its deck.
Their material focuses on diagnosing and improving sales conversations, not reframing a cybersecurity pitch, showing a moat or arming an internal champion.
Use Wright as a complementary voice when the deck problem turns out to be a conversation problem, not as a substitute for a deck-focused argument.
Choose Sayanta Goswami when a campaign needs to change how enterprise buyers categorise the company before any sales conversation, and the go-to-market narrative needs to shift that perception.
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Goswami's posts argue that firms lose deals to inferior competitors because a senior buyer researches the company, forms a view during that silent research and places the firm in a cheaper or wrong category.
Once that placement happens, the comparison set changes and the sales team walks into a conversation that was already decided.
One post applies this to LinkedIn ads that produced strong click and engagement numbers but attracted people who admired the firm and could not buy; after rebuilding the language, proof assets and positioning, the post claims $5.5M in qualified pipeline in 14 weeks, sales cycles compressed from six months to eight weeks, and a Fortune 500 referral partnership.
For a cybersecurity company whose enterprise narrative is being misread before the first meeting, this is a more direct alternative than Goldberg's deck-structure argument: it targets buyer perception rather than slide purpose.
The tradeoff is credibility and fit for a deck-rewrite campaign.
Goswami's posts lean heavily on a proprietary named framework, a promotional sign-off and specific revenue and cycle-time claims drawn from their own account that cannot be verified from the posts here.
The work focuses on positioning and signals, not a practical pitch-deck or slide-level method, so a sponsor wanting the deck itself rebuilt would still need that craft from elsewhere.
The posts invite readers to send a direct message, but provide no sponsorship, rates or inquiry route; confirm commercial availability before budgeting.
Goswami is stronger when the real problem is how enterprise buyers classify the company before the first call, not when the main deliverable is a revised deck.
Choose Zach Murphy when the sponsor wants a broader go-to-market argument about why marketing content and funnels fail to help buyers decide, aimed at marketing and sales leadership rather than deck craft.
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Murphy's posts say most marketing teams are good at generating interest and bad at helping people make a decision; funnels map content to stages and give buyers more homework, while real buyers face internal pressure from CFO justification, legal review, prior failed attempts, complexity concerns and existing contracts.
Murphy reframes the task as selling to situations rather than stages and names internal friction as the biggest threat to pipeline.
A second post uses a Gartner statistic that most business leaders do not see marketing as instrumental to business evolution, then argues marketing must translate into business outcomes, show up as a strategist, own customer intelligence, lead cross-functional enablement and tell a story a CFO would fund.
That is useful for a cybersecurity company trying to settle the Sales-versus-Marketing disagreement that Goldberg's post also addresses: Murphy makes the marketing-side case for why the old funnel logic no longer helps the buyer.
The tradeoff is specificity and recency.
Murphy's posts are not cybersecurity-specific, do not discuss pitch-deck construction and are older than the two alternatives reviewed here.
A sponsor would need to translate the stage-versus-situation argument into security buying-committee terms and connect it to a deck rewrite.
Murphy is better for a campaign that wants a GTM and marketing-leadership reframe around decision friction, not slide-by-slide deck guidance or security-category proof.
The posts provide no sponsorship, rates or inquiry route; confirm commercial availability before committing budget.
Based on the full text of three LinkedIn posts dated 15–23 September 2026.
They cover pitch decks for informed buyers, category timing and career decisions, and interest in digital executive and digital risk protection markets.
This selection shows short-form commentary, not a complete account of Goldberg’s work or credentials.
